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YOU HAVE ONE NEW MESSAGE—THE 
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CORRECTLY 
APPLIES THE SPOKEO FRAMEWORK TO 
TCPA CLAIMS FOR UNSOLICITED TEXT 
MESSAGING 
Mary Love* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Eleventh Circuit recently created a circuit split regarding whether an 
unsolicited text message constitutes a concrete injury necessary to establish 
standing under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA). The issue of 
standing under Article III was extensively addressed in the Supreme Court 
decision, Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins.1 However, the circuit courts have differed in their 
application of the Spokeo framework to claims alleging a violation of the TCPA for 
receiving unsolicited text messages.2 The disagreement among the circuit courts 
centers around whether there is a concrete injury. The impact of this disagreement 
is costly for businesses that may be exposing themselves to endless litigation by 
sending a simple text message. The Eleventh Circuit, contrary to the Second and 
Ninth Circuits, properly applied the Spokeo framework and held that there was no 
concrete injury.3 In reaching its decision, the Eleventh Circuit conducted an in-
depth comparison of historical harms to the alleged harm and closely studied 
congressional intent underlying the TCPA’s enactment.4 Furthermore, the 
Eleventh Circuit’s Spokeo analysis is in line with other courts addressing the issue 
of intangible harms. Given the thorough analysis set forth in Spokeo and the 
Eleventh Circuit’s reasoned application of the TCPA, the Supreme Court should 
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 1. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016).  
 2. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, 105 Stat. 2394 (codified 
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2018)); see Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1170 (11th Cir. 2019); 
Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 93 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 677 
(2019); Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 3. See Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1165. 
 4. Id. at 1168–72. 
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resolve the circuit split by adopting the Eleventh Circuit’s approach. 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, the Supreme Court provided a framework for courts to 
use when evaluating the issue of standing, particularly whether there is an injury 
in fact.5 The Supreme Court emphasized two main points regarding injuries in 
fact: (1) Congress cannot statutorily create standing where a plaintiff would not 
otherwise have standing; and (2) an injury in fact must be both concrete and 
particularized.6 A particularized injury must personally affect the plaintiff in an 
individual way.7 However, this is only one requirement for an injury in fact; the 
injury must also be concrete.8 The Court described a concrete injury as an injury 
that actually exists.9 
In its opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished between tangible and 
intangible injuries, noting that although intangible injuries might be harder to 
identify, they can still be concrete.10 The Court instructed that history and the 
judgment of Congress are important to determining if an intangible harm is an 
injury in fact.11 Regarding history, the Court stated, “it is instructive to consider 
whether an alleged intangible harm has a close relationship to a harm that has 
traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or 
American courts.”12 With respect to the judgment of Congress, the Court 
emphasized that although Congress is well suited to identify intangible harms, 
“Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory 
violation.”13 Indeed, the Court noted that in some circumstances a statutory 
violation occurs but no harm results.14 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The facts of the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Salcedo v. Hanna are brief. The 
plaintiff, John Salcedo, received a single, unsolicited text message from his former 
attorney, Alex Hanna, offering him a ten percent discount on services.15 Salcedo 
then filed suit in district court alleging that Hanna violated the TCPA.16 Hanna 
moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming Salcedo lacked standing.17 Although 
the district court expressed an opinion that Salcedo did have standing, the court 
 
 5. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547–49. 
 6. Id. at 1547–48. 
 7. Id. at 1548. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 1549. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 1543. 
 14. Id. at 1550. 
 15. Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1165 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
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certified an interlocutory appeal to the Eleventh Circuit.18 The Eleventh Circuit 
accepted the appeal and analyzed the issue of standing.19 
A.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
First, the Eleventh Circuit looked at the history of the TCPA.20 The TCPA was 
enacted in 1991 to restrict the use of telephone dialing systems from sending 
unsolicited calls to residential homes and from sending unsolicited 
advertisements to facsimile machines.21 The TCPA authorizes the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to implement regulations22 and creates a 
private right of action for consumers.23 The Eleventh Circuit noted two important 
updates to the TCPA: (1) the TCPA was amended “to allow the FCC to exempt 
free-to-receive cellular calls”; and (2) the FCC extended the statute to apply to text 
messages.24 The court opined that facially Salcedo’s complaint appeared to state a 
cause of action.25 
The court next considered the judicial power under Article III to hear “Cases” 
and “Controversies.”26 The court noted that even when Congress appears to grant 
the federal courts jurisdiction, courts “are still obliged to examine whether 
jurisdiction exists under the Constitution.”27 Article III standing requires the 
plaintiff “(1) suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed by a favorable 
judicial decision.”28 The first element, an injury in fact, was at issue in this case.29 
In order to have standing, the injury must be concrete; or in other words, “it must 
actually exist.”30 Under the Spokeo framework, if the concreteness of an injury is 
not readily ascertainable, courts look to Congress for guidance.31 Notably, the 
Spokeo decision stated, “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the 
context of a statutory violation.”32 
Next, the Eleventh Circuit analyzed its existing precedent regarding standing 
to sue for a single violation of the TCPA.33 The court compared Salcedo’s 
allegations to the facts of Palm Beach Golf Center-Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., 
P.A., where it previously found an individual had standing to sue under the TCPA 
 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. Because its “order ‘involve[d] a controlling question of law’ . . . the [district] court allowed 
Salcedo to pursue an interlocutory appeal,” which was granted under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Id. 
 20. Id. at 1165–66. 
 21. Id. at 1166. 
 22. Id.; Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-243 § 3(b)(2), 105 Stat. 2394, 
2396 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(2) (2018)). 
 23. Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991 § 3(b)(3) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3)). 
 24. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1166. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016)). 
 29. Id. at 1165. 
 30. Id. at 1167. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. (quoting Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549). 
 33. Id. 
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for receiving a single junk fax.34 The court first compared the tangible costs of 
receiving a junk fax with Salcedo’s allegations.35 Receiving a fax has monetary costs 
such as paper, ink, and toner.36 By contrast, Salcedo’s complaint failed to allege 
the text message cost him any money.37 Next, the court looked to the intangible 
costs and found that the costs of receiving a fax message and a text message were 
substantially different.38 “A fax message consumes the receiving device entirely,” 
whereas “[a] cell phone user can continue to use all of the device’s functions, 
including receiving other messages, while it is receiving a text message.”39 Thus, 
the Eleventh Circuit found Palm Beach to be factually distinct and not binding in 
the case at bar.40 
The court then turned to Congress for guidance.41 Notably, Congress was silent 
regarding text messaging generally.42 Although text messaging did not exist at the 
time the TCPA was passed in the form it exists today, Congress has amended the 
TCPA several times without adding unsolicited text messages to the provision at 
issue.43 However, the FCC, through its rulemaking authority, has extended the 
voice call provisions of the TCPA to text messages. The court stated, “At most, we 
could take Congress’s silence as tacit approval of that agency action.”44 Instead, 
the court found that Congress was particularly concerned with privacy in the 
home when it enacted the TCPA.45 This purpose does not logically extend to text 
messaging because cell phones are routinely taken outside the home.46 Moreover, 
the court noted that the amendment to the TCPA “allowing the FCC to exempt 
free-to-receive calls to cell phones” is evidence that Congress was less concerned 
with unsolicited calls to cell phones.47 
Finally, the court looked to historical practices to determine if this intangible 
harm was closely related to other traditionally recognized harms. First, the court 
examined the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.48 Courts recognize torts of this 
kind when an intrusion of privacy is “objectively serious and universally 
condemnable.”49 The Eleventh Circuit found Salcedo’s allegations fell short of 
 
 34. Id. at 1167–68; see also Palm Beach Golf Center–Boca, Inc. v. John G. Sarris, D.D.S., P.A., 
781 F.3d 1245, 1252–53 (11th Cir. 2015). 
 35. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168. 
 36. Id. at 1167–68. 
 37. Id. at 1168. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 1168–69. 
 42. Id. In a footnote, the court recognized that recent amendments to the TCPA “expressly 
include text messaging” in provisions proscribing false transfers of caller ID information. Id. at 1169 
n.7; see generally Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-141 § 503(a), 132 Stat. 
348, 1091–92 (to be codified at 47 U.S.C. § 227(e)). 
 43. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1169. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 1170. 
 48. Id. at 1171. 
 49. Id. 
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this requirement.50 The court also noted, “Salcedo’s reasoning would equate 
opening your private mail—a serious intrusion indeed—with mailing you a 
postcard.”51 Second, the court analyzed the torts of trespass and nuisance and 
found both were inapplicable because the allegations did not demonstrate that 
the text message infringed on real property.52 Lastly, the court turned to the torts 
of conversion and trespass to chattel.53 The court observed that Salcedo’s 
allegations slightly resembled those historical harms, but “differ[ed] so 
significantly in degree as to undermine his position.”54 
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under the Spokeo framework, Salcedo 
failed to allege a concrete injury and thus lacked standing to bring suit under the 
TCPA.55 It is important to note the concurrence, which emphasized that the 
majority’s holding does not foreclose the possibility that a plaintiff who receives 
“multiple unwanted and unsolicited text messages may have standing to sue under 
the TCPA.”56 This indicates that future plaintiffs might be allowed to pursue 
similar claims where the contact is more severe. 
B.  THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S REASONING 
On the other side of the circuit split, the Second and Ninth Circuits have 
opined that a concrete injury can derive from a single, unsolicited text message.57 
In the Van Patten case, the plaintiff received text messages from a business the 
plaintiff had a former relationship with.58 Although the court found the plaintiff 
had standing to sue under the TCPA, it nevertheless held in favor of the 
defendants because the plaintiff gave prior consent to receive such messages; thus, 
the text message was not “unsolicited.”59 
The Ninth Circuit first explored the history of courts recognizing invasion of 
privacy harms in one sentence: “Actions to remedy defendants’ invasions of 
privacy, intrusion upon seclusion, and nuisance have long been heard by 
American courts, and the right of privacy is recognized by most states.”60 The court 
noted that Congress enacted the TCPA with privacy and nuisance concerns.61 The 
Ninth Circuit next turned to the harm Congress sought to address through the 
TCPA.62 The court stated, “Congress identified unsolicited contact as a concrete 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1172. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 1173–74 (Pryor, J., concurring). 
 57. Melito v. Experian Mktg. Sols., Inc., 923 F.3d 85, 95 (2d Cir. 2019); Van Patten v. Vertical 
Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). For purposes of analyzing this side of the 
circuit split, this Case Note will focus on the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit. Although the plaintiff 
in Van Patten received two unsolicited text messages, the court’s reasoning extends to single message 
fact patterns. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. 
 58. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1041. 
 59. Id. at 1046. 
 60. Id. at 1043. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. 
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harm.”63 The court then attempted to equate the privacy concerns of receiving an 
unsolicited phone call in someone’s home with receiving a single text message, 
which may or may not be received in the home.64 Altogether, the court combined 
the single sentence of tort history with congressional purpose to find a concrete 
injury existed.65 The Spokeo decision guides courts to conduct a more thorough 
analysis when the alleged harm is difficult to recognize. Indeed, the Eleventh 
Circuit’s Salcedo analysis is more consistent with how other federal circuit courts 
apply the Spokeo framework to similar standing issues.66 Comparing the Van Patten 
analysis with other cases reveals how deficient the analysis is. 
C.  THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT PROPERLY APPLIED THE SPOKEO FRAMEWORK 
In the Spokeo decision, the Supreme Court was concerned with the Ninth 
Circuit’s failure to distinguish between the injury in fact requirements of 
concreteness and particularization.67 The Court explained that an injury may be 
particularized, but nevertheless fail for not being concrete.68 The Ninth Circuit’s 
analytical shortfall in the Spokeo decision is the same problem with its Van Patten 
decision.69 Both the Salcedo and Van Patten opinions failed to discuss 
particularization in detail, presumably because it was quite clear that the alleged 
harm personally and individually affected the plaintiffs.70 However, the Ninth 
Circuit’s analysis of intangible harms is deficient in the sense that it only 
identified a particularized harm to the plaintiff and failed to adequately explain a 
concrete injury as instructed by the Supreme Court. 
One point is clear from the Supreme Court’s reasoning: courts must find a 
concrete injury in fact even when Congress identifies an intangible harm.71 
However, the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo does support the assertion that 
when Congress identifies an intangible harm, courts should show deference.72 
The Van Patten decision conveniently skirted around the fact that Congress has 
not explicitly extended the protections of the TCPA to text messaging. As the 
Eleventh Circuit noted, it was the FCC that extended the voice call provision of 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. See DiNaples v. MRS BPO, LLC, 934 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2019) (finding a concrete injury 
where a debt collector exposed the plaintiff’s QR code in violation of the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act); Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that the plaintiffs 
suffered a concrete injury under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act from improper use 
of facial recognition technology); Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (finding that the plaintiff suffered an injury in fact under the Fair and Accurate Credit 
Transactions Act when she received a receipt displaying her full credit card information); Susinno v. 
Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017) (finding that the plaintiff suffered a concrete 
injury under the TCPA for receiving an unsolicited phone call and one-minute voicemail). 
 67. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1550 (2016). 
 68. Id. at 1548–49. 
 69. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043; Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409, 413–14 (9th Cir. 
2014). 
 70. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043; Robins, 742 F.3d at 412. 
 71. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549. 
 72. Id. 
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the TCPA to text messaging.73 Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s deference to Congress is 
severely undermined by the fact that Congress has not identified text messaging 
as an intangible harm. Furthermore, a closer look at the FCC guidance undercuts 
the finding of a concrete injury for unsolicited text messaging.74 In extending the 
voice call provisions to text messages, the FCC stated: 
This encompasses both voice calls and text calls to wireless numbers 
including, for example, short message service (SMS) calls, provided the call 
is made to a telephone number assigned to such service. Congress found that 
automated or prerecorded telephone calls were a greater nuisance and 
invasion of privacy than live solicitation calls. Moreover, such calls can be 
costly and inconvenient.75 
This guidance mentions the cost and inconvenience of “text calls,” which, as the 
Eleventh Circuit explained, often do not cost the receiver anything and at most 
cause a couple of seconds of inconvenience.76 Therefore, under this guidance, 
finding a concrete injury is more difficult where the plaintiff incurred no extra 
cost and the inconvenience is minimal. Where other courts have faced a difficult 
standing question, the judgment of Congress is easily ascertained because the 
statute at issue explicitly prohibits the act or omission alleged.77 
Next, the Ninth Circuit failed to properly define the harm at issue. The harm 
the Ninth Circuit identified was unsolicited contact.78 The Eleventh Circuit 
defined the harm more narrowly, as unsolicited text messages.79 The Ninth 
Circuit’s overgeneralization of the harm is not only an incorrect application of 
law but also contrary to the history of the TCPA. In an attempt to reconcile its 
definition of harm with the legislative history and purpose of the TCPA, the 
Ninth Circuit performed a scant, incomplete analysis of the history.80 The Ninth 
Circuit simply stated that invasions of privacy and nuisance are torts traditionally 
recognized by courts.81 Specifically, the court stated that “in enacting the TCPA, 
Congress made specific findings that ‘unrestricted telemarketing can be an 
intrusive invasion of privacy’ and are ‘nuisance.’”82 However accurate this may be, 
the Ninth Circuit failed to compare those traditional torts to the alleged harm at 
issue: unsolicited text messaging. Upon a more thorough inspection, as performed 
by the Eleventh Circuit, it is clear that unsolicited text messaging is sufficiently 
 
 73. Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1169 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 74. Rules and Regulations Implementing the Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 18 
FCC Rcd. 14014, 14115 (2003). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id.; Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168. 
 77. See DiNaples v. MRS BPO, LLC, 934 F.3d 275, 280 (3d Cir. 2019); Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 
932 F.3d 1264, 1275 (9th Cir. 2019); Jeffries v. Volume Servs. Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1066 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019); Susinno v. Work Out World Inc., 862 F.3d 346, 348 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 78. Van Patten v. Vertical Fitness Grp., LLC, 847 F.3d 1037, 1043 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 79. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1170. 
 80. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43. 
 81. Id. at 1043. 
 82. Id. (quoting Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-243 § 2, 105 Stat. 
2394). 
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distinct from the traditional torts of invasion of privacy, nuisance, and others.83 
A look at other courts’ decisions reveals that Van Patten is an anomaly. Other 
courts—even those within the Ninth Circuit—define the harm at issue more 
narrowly and properly analyze that specific harm by comparing it to other 
traditionally recognized harms.84 In Patel v. Facebook, the Ninth Circuit closely 
analyzed the common law history of privacy rights in connection with 
technological invasions of privacy.85 Specifically, the court analyzed whether the 
alleged harm was similar to an invasion of privacy to determine whether a close 
relationship existed.86 This is very different from its Van Patten analysis which 
simply stated that an invasion of privacy can constitute a cause of action and that 
the purpose of the TCPA is to protect privacy interests, and then concluded the 
unsolicited text message had a close tie to a traditional harm.87 Similarly, the D.C. 
Circuit identified the harm narrowly as “avoiding an increased risk of identity 
theft.”88 The court then compared the alleged harm with common law breach of 
confidence.89 The court noted that the statutory violation at issue and breach of 
confidence involve very similar relationships with respect to trust.90 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Van Patten purported to apply the Spokeo 
framework for determining whether a concrete injury exists.91 However, the 
analysis is truncated and simply restates the analysis urged by the Supreme Court 
without a thorough application. The type of harm the Ninth Circuit recognized 
is particularly troublesome in a society so increasingly dependent on cell phone 
usage. Congress sought to protect the sanctity of the home from unwanted 
telemarking calls.92 Text messaging occurs nearly everywhere a person goes and is 
hardly confined to the privacy of one’s home. 
Hopefully, the Supreme Court will provide guidance regarding the application 
of Spokeo to TCPA claims for unsolicited text messages. However, as it stands, the 
circuit courts disagree as to whether an unsolicited text message is a concrete 
injury under the TCPA. The Salcedo opinion provides a thorough analysis and 
very carefully applies the Spokeo framework.93 Until Congress or the Supreme 
 
 83. Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1170–72. 
 84. See Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264, 1270 (9th Cir. 2019); Jeffries v. Volume Servs. 
Am., Inc., 928 F.3d 1059, 1064 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 85. Patel, 932 F.3d at 1271–73. 
 86. Id. at 1273. 
 87. See Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1043. 
 88. Jeffries, 928 F.3d at 1064. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 1064–65. 
 91. Van Patten, 847 F.3d at 1042–43. 
 92. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-243 § 2, 105 Stat. 2394, 
2394–95 (repeatedly emphasizing in the findings a concern for privacy within the home). 
 93. See Salcedo v. Hanna, 936 F.3d 1162, 1166–73 (11th Cir. 2019). The Eleventh Circuit 
recently acknowledged how it can be a very close call to find standing. Glasser v. Hilton Grand 
Vacations Co., LLC, 948 F.3d 1301, 1306 (11th Cir. 2020) (citing Salcedo, 936 F.3d at 1168). In so 
doing, the court referenced the Salcedo case to demonstrate the difficulty in determining whether a 
concrete injury exists. Id. 
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Court addresses this issue, businesses should beware of sending potentially 
unsolicited contact. 
